In Somalia, the U.S. Army brass was guilty of violating some basic war-fighting principles. It underestimated the enemy. it neglected contingency planning, it lacked clear command and control between U.S. and U.N. units. It was the job of Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery, the U.S. commander on scene in Mogadishu, to raise hell when Defense Secretary Les Aspin refused his request to have Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles for just such rescue missions, apparently because it never occurred to him or his advisers that Murphy’s Law applies in war the same as anywhere else: if something can go wrong, it will. This need for armor did not just suddenly appear; it had been growing for months, and Montgomery knew this, In fact, there were armored carriers available from other U.N. units in Mogadishu, but Montgomery failed to assemble a scratch armored force from among them until it was too late. He also should have had an air cap of C-130 Spectre strike planes ready to lay down a covering wall of fire the minute the rangers got into trouble.
Coming right on the heels of the cakewalk of Desert Storm in 1991, the Somalia disaster has outraged the U.S. military community around the world. “we fought to win in the desert,” said a ranger colonel who is the best-serving warrior I know. “This erased our sins from Vietnam, and now we send people on another mission impossible.” Aspin’s interference in military operations deepened the anger. “Who is he to deny a commander in the field a company of armor while sitting on his royal throne?” asked a lieutenant colonel and veteran of two wars. “The guy blows $5 billion on a Seawolf submarine and can’t spend a few dollars to fly in protection.”
The lack of contingency planning hit a particularly raw nerve among soldiers who identified only too readily with the rangers. “When there’s a risk of imperfect intelligence information, you always safeside the operation,” one airborne infantry major said. “Mistakes to us become little white crosses.” Aspiin’s comment that one of the soldiers taken prisoner during the fight is a “detainee” also provoked rage. “A prisoner is, a prisoner,” said a highly decorated former POW of the gulf war. “Trying to whitewash the situation with a name change ain’t gonna make it.”
Mixing politics and war fighting doesn’t make sense. Neither does the idea of civilians running a war from afar. These were vital lessons we learned the hard way in Vietnam. The gulf war reinforced these lessons when Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf was given his head and won with minimal casualties. This time the people should demand accountability from our military and civilian leaders. If this means a new secretary of defense, we should have one who knows war fighting. Aspin’s understanding of the military is almost academic, and he drives professional soldiers nuts with his inability to make decisions. His replacement must get rid of the incompetent top brass throughout the military and have the moxie to tell civilians to stick to politics and butt out of warfare. It took almost 400,000 dead and wounded in Vietnam before we admitted our error there. In Somalia, let’s reclaim hostages and go home. Mogadishu is still a long way from the Mekong Delta, but let’s not take even one more step in that direction.
